• Criminal

Northern District of Court of Texas

United states of America v. versus Humberto Fidel Regalado Cuellar,

Whether the government presented sufficient evidence at Cuellar's trial to support his conviction of international money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i).

The Present court concludes that the evidence was sufficient to prove all elements of the offence.

In United States v. Bieganowski it was held that the plain language of the statute of conviction, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i), which outlaws international money laundering, requires the government to prove five distinct elements. Firstly, it must show that the transportation or attempted transportation of funds was across U.S. borders. Secondly, the funds in question must be the proceeds of specified unlawful activity. Thirdly, the accused must know that the funds represent such proceeds. Fourthly, the transportation of the funds must have been designed (in whole or in part) to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership or control of the proceeds. Fifthly, the accused must know that such concealment was part of the transportation plan or design.

The panel unanimously found that the government's proof was sufficient to establish the first three elements. The issue narrows to the fourth and fifth elements. Celllur argued that the government's proof shows that the money was hidden to allow it to be transported to Mexico that is not enough to sustain a conviction. But the Court held that the transportation of the funds to the border begins when they leave the owner's hands and are delivered to the courier. The transportation ends when the funds arrive at the destination. The government adequately established the concealment prong of the statute, i.e. that Cuellar's transportation of the funds was designed, in whole or in part, to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership or control of the proceeds.

In United States v. Short and United States v. Cihak circuit court hold that simply taking steps to hide illicit funds is sufficient to prove concealment.

In United States v. Delgado, 256 F.3d 264, 273(5th Cir. 2001)it was held that The verdict will be affirmed if a reasonable trial of fact could conclude from the evidence that the elements of the offence were established beyond a reasonable doubt. In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, this court does not evaluate the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses but views the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, drawing all reasonable inferences to support the Verdict

• Constitution

Supreme Court of Kentucky

Ralph Baze and Thomas c. bowling v. Jonathan d. Rees, commissioner, Kentucky department of corrections; Glenn Haeberlin, warden, Kentucky state penitentiary; and Ernie Fletcher, governor of Kentucky

Method of sentencing-Whether the lethal injection provisions for execution protocol violate or threaten to violate the rights of Baze and Bowling(appeallants) to be free from cruel and unusual punishment in the state of Kentucky

Pursuant to CR 57 and KRS 418.040, appellant sought a declaratory Judgment that the lethal injection method of execution violates their federal and state rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.

Present court held that the lethal injection method used in Kentucky is not a violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Section 17 of the Kentucky Constitution's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. The appellants have not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the method of execution by lethal injection deviates from contemporary norms and societal standards in regard to capital punishment or it offends the dignity of the prisoners and society as a whole by inflicting unnecessary physical pain. There is no preponderance of the evidence that the method of legal injection in Kentucky is so inept that it deprives the parties of due process and fundamental fairness. Court cited the following decisions to substantiate their reasoning.

In Wood v. Commonwealth, 142 S .W .3d 24 (Ky. 2004), it was held that in order to succeed, the party claming violation must establish such constitutional violations by a preponderance of the evidence.

In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S . 153, 96 S .Ct. 2909, 49 L .Ed .2d 859 (1976) court held that a method of execution is considered to be cruel and unusual punishment under the Federal Constitution when the procedure for execution creates a substantial risk of wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, torture or lingering death.In reviewing whether the method of execution is a constitutional violation, courts must consider whether it is contrary to evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.

In Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S . 86, 78 S.Ct. 590, 2 L.Ed .2d 630 (1958).

Prior interpretation of Section 17 of the Kentucky Constitution provides that a method of punishment is cruel and unusual if it shocks the moral sense of all reasonable men as to what is right and proper under the circumstances.